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El factor institucional más importante en la historia de la industria del azúcar en Cuba des-
pués de 1930 fue la cuota de exportación que obtuvo en el mercado de los Estados Unidos en 1934. 
Este artículo revisa las tesis que consideran ese hecho como relativamente positivo y lo hace a la 
luz de los acontecimientos posteriores, que muestran que dicho sistema de cuotas perjudicó a la 
economía insular, sobre todo en la década de 1950, y examinando los stock prices de las empresas 
del sector, un buen indicador de las expectativas de retorno de las inversiones. Como conclusión 
afirma que el reparto del consumo azucarero norteamericano entre diferentes abastecedores fue 
fruto de la convicción de que el instrumento arancelario usado hasta entonces para proteger a la 
producción remolachera interna ya no era eficaz. 
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If one policy loomed large in the interwar history of Cuban sugar, it was the 
sugar quota adopted by the United States in 1934. Established under the rubric of 
the US «Sugar Program», the sugar quota governed the exports of Cuba’s princi-
pal crop to its principal market. Sugar controls in the United States became cen-
tral to the health and future of the Cuban economy. The importance of the United 
States as a market for Cuban sugar made any policy that governed that market 
central to Cuba’s economic prospects. The international crisis and collapse of 
Cuba’s access to the US market after 1929 made the restoration of that outlet for 
Cuban sugar an acute necessity. In 1929, just prior to the onset of the crisis, Cu-
ba’s sugar exports to the United States represented between 25 and 30 percent of 
Cuban national income —typical of the previous decade. Earnings from sugar 
———— 
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exports to all destinations represented between 35 and 40 percent. According to 
existing estimates, from 1929 to 1933, Cuban real national income fell around 30 
percent. The sharp reduction of sugar export revenues from the US market alone 
were equal to 60 percent of the decline in real national income2. At the time of its 
inauguration, political rhetoric in Washington and Havana praised the sugar quo-
ta as a measure that would strengthen, if not restore, Cuba’s position in the US 
sugar market. In apparent agreement, dominant views in the economic history of 
Cuba as well as the regulatory history of the United States interpret the US sugar 
quota as a policy measure that had positive consequences for Cuba. 
If the literature casts a favorable light on the quota’s effects on Cuban eco-
nomic and political outcomes, recent work challenges the benign view of the 
sugar quota during the 1950s. New evidence shows that the quota system expo-
sed the Cuban sugar industry more directly to the risks of domestic politics of the 
United States —because the volume of exports to its most important market were 
made strictly dependent on decisions in Washington about the size of Cuba’s 
quota. Domestic sugar interests naturally had greater influence in the United Sta-
tes’ representative political institutions over this decision than did Cuban sugar 
interests or diplomats. In a recent article, A.D. Dye and R. Sicotte show that a 
revision of the Sugar Program in 1956 exposed the Cuban sugar industry to a 
serious economic shock that came through a large unanticipated reduction in Cu-
ba’s sugar quota. The size and significance of this shock has been overlooked in 
the historiography, in part, because it was obscured by contemporaneous offset-
ting economic events. Sugar prices, aggregate income, unemployment, wages, 
and other indicators performed well in 1957 and 1958, the years immediately 
after the new sugar quota legislation went into effect.3 J.I. Domínguez suggests 
that this may explain why most scholars so strongly reject the proposition that 
economic events catapulted the island nation into revolution4. Scholarly attention 
has focused, instead, on the crisis in Cuban politics caused by the constitutional 
illegitimacy of the Batista regime, the popular demand to restore democracy, loss 
of faith in a corrupt political system, and the combination of strategic and milita-
ry events that led to the rise of Fidel Castro’s July 26th Movement. 
Without challenging the primacy of the political explanation, A.D. Dye and 
R. Sicotte show that the negative consequences of the downward revision in the 
———— 
 2 This figure is a rough estimate since estimates GDP are subject to a large margin of error. For 
the data sources, see A. SANTAMARÍA, Sin azúcar no hay país: la industria azucarera y la economía 
cubana (1919-1939), Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, CSIC, 
and Diputación de Sevilla, 2002, pp. 405, 416 and 418; O. ZANETTI, Los cautivos de la reciprocidad, 
La Habana, ENPES, 1989, app., table 2, and J. ALIENES, Características fundamentales de la economía 
cubana, La Habana, Biblioteca de Economía Cubana, Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1950. 
 3 A.D. DYE and R. SICOTTE, «The US Sugar Program and the Cuban Revolution», Journal of 
Economic History, 64/3, Cambridge, UK, 2004, pp. 673-704. 
 4 J.I. DOMÍNGUEZ, Cuba: Order and Revolution, Cambridge, Mass.. Harvard University, 
Belknap Press, 1978, pp. 120-9. 
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sugar quota were a major issue to contemporaries, which contributed to the loss 
of faith among the «economic classes» in Batista’s ability to find a solution to the 
sugar question. By comparing projections of anticipated earnings from sugar ex-
ports to the US market under the old and new legislation, they show that the 
downwardly revised quota reduced the expected long-run rate of growth in ex-
port earnings in the US sugar market by about 70 percent. Two things prevented 
those negative effects from being felt immediately. First, they were muted in the 
immediate aftermath of the passage of the 1956 legislation because there were 
programmed delays in its implementation. Second, the Suez crisis, labor strikes 
in Hawaii, and other remote events disrupted short-run supplies of sugar in global 
markets and boosted the sugar price on the world market temporarily. Nevert-
heless, experts forecasted a dismal long-run growth path for Cuban sugar exports, 
punctuated erratically by occasional brief periods of favorable prices contingent 
upon exogenous sugar supply disruptions in the rest of the world. Noting that 
forward-looking investors in sugar-related securities markets would be responsi-
ve to these predictions, Dye and Sicotte examine the behavior of the stock prices 
of sugar companies in Cuba and the mainland United States. They find that, after 
1956, there was a large increase in the risk associated with investment in shares 
in Cuban sugar companies. Further evidence shows that the fallout from the grim 
long-run prospects for the Cuban sugar industry, and the failure of the ruling re-
gime to come up with an alternative plan, contributed to the decline in political 
support for Batista, which mounted throughout the latter half of the 1950s.5 
These findings raise questions about the favorable light cast upon the inaugu-
ration of the sugar quota policy in the 1930s. As in the 1950s, the sugar quota 
system exposed Cuban sugar to risks of US domestic politics in the 1930s. What 
caused the nature of this political solution to Cuba’s access in the US sugar mar-
ket to differ in the 1930s? Two views have been offered. One view, put forth by 
A.O. Krueger, submits that the United States Government, through the leadership 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the State Department, were motivated to 
use sugar policy to stimulate the Cuban economy and restore political order after 
the collapse of the Gerardo Machado regime in 19336. A second view, offered by 
A. Santamaría, proposes that developments in the US sugar market caused an 
unusual alignment in the political interests of Cuban sugar producers and US beet 
sugar producers7. The adoption of a sugar quota, it is argued, served both their 
interests, hence the unlikely marriage of strange bedfellows. The current essay 
———— 
 5 A.D. DYE and R. SICOTTE [3]. 
 6 A.O. KRUEGER, «The Political Economy of Controls: American Sugar», L. ALSTON, T. EG-
GERTSSON and D.C. NORTH (eds.), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 169-218 (first appeared in M. SCOTT and D. LAL (eds.), 
Public Policy and Development: Essays in Honour of Ian Little, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1990). 
 7 A. SANTAMARÍA [2]. 
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presents evidence that suggests, first, that the adoption of the sugar quota was 
less favorable to Cuba than the literature has reflected, and second, that neither of 
the explanations outlined is fully accurate. 
The main purpose of the essay is to reconsider the intent of the inauguration 
of the Sugar Program to gain a new perspective on the political economy of its 
inauguration. It approaches this question, first, by observing the design of the 
institutions that were established to govern the Sugar Program in the United Sta-
tes and, second, by looking at the performance sugar companies to determine 
which participants benefited most from the program. To achieve the latter, I pre-
sent an index of the stock prices of sugar companies, which serves as an effective 
indicator of sugar-company performance because it reflects the views of infor-
med investors regarding the expected effects of the policy changes under ques-
tion. The evidence shows that the US beet sugar industry was hostile to Cuba’s 
participation in the program. It does not support the proposition that the original 
intent of the program was primarily to help Cuba; instead, it is consistent with an 
explanation driven by interest-group politics that emphasizes the multidimensio-
nality of the salient political issues. 
 
 
COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
 
One of the most important contributions to this question comes from A. San-
tamaría’s comprehensive and insightful study of the Cuban sugar industry during 
the interwar period. He finds that inauguration of the Sugar Program in the Uni-
ted States, under the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934, accommodated the restructu-
ring of the Cuban sugar-dominated economy to the post-depression reality of its 
market in the United States. First, it represented a resolution of the crisis in the 
system of trade reciprocity that had characterized Cuban-US economic relations 
since 1903, which allowed Cuba to maintain its specialization in sugar. It did so 
by creating an institution by which cost-efficient Cuban sugar exports and the 
politically backed supply of US beet sugar were made consistent with a diminis-
hed demand for sugar in the US market during the 1930s. Santamaría highlights 
some other positive outcomes. First, the restriction on raw sugar exports stimula-
ted the diversification of the products made by the Cuban sugar industry, that is, 
the production of by-products, such as molasses, alcohol and distilled beverages. 
Also, Cuba obtained a toehold in the US refined sugar market, from which it had 
been prohibited in the 1920s. Second, as part of the negotiated package, Cuba 
received a reduction in the tariff it paid for exporting sugar to the United States, 
indeed, the lowest tariff it had had in the US market since 18948. 
———— 
 8 Ibidem, pp. 227-40. 
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The definitive piece, to date, from the standpoint of US regulatory history, is 
A.O. Krueger’s study of the origins and path-dependence of the US sugar con-
trols. She focuses on the question of program’s capacity for survival. Once in 
place the took on a «life of its own», and it has remained in effect for seventy 
years at the time the essay was written. The institutions put in place persisted 
because, once created, the program was «seized upon» by domestic sugar inte-
rests that lobbied to preserve the benefits they received from it9. 
Yet ironically, despite the domestic interest-group explanation of the Sugar 
Program’s persistence, she finds that interest group politics does not help to ex-
plain the inauguration. Rather, she finds that the Franklin D. Roosevelt Adminis-
tration acted as a «benevolent guardian» when it introduced the program in 1934. 
In part, it was introduced as a measure to reverse the perceived damage of the 
Hawley-Smoot tariff of 1930 (passed by the previous Republican Administra-
tion). However, A.O. Krueger concludes that Roosevelt’s motive was «primarily 
to shore up the Cuban economy and only secondarily to increase American pro-
ducers’ incomes» to stabilize the Cuban political situation. In her analysis, the 
unintended capture by special interests became visible in 1960, when Cuba’s 
quota was removed. Even though the program’s primary justification had vanis-
hed, the quota system survived and became an instrument of US Cold War policy 
in the Caribbean —an unanticipated consequence10. 
By contrast, historians writing about these events from the standpoint of Cu-
ban political economy interpret the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration’s pri-
mary motives as a self-interested or rational public choice. O. Zanetti observes 
that Roosevelt resisted pressure from beet sugar interests, which sought to mini-
mize the quota allocated to Cuba. Refusing, the President insisted that he did not 
want the quota policy to induce excessive expansion of the inefficient domestic 
sugar industry, which would unnecessarily raise the cost of sugar to consumers. 
Though he resisted political pressure from one constituency, it was to achieve 
political objectives that favored another constituency11. 
A. Santamaría observing a potential for a political coalition of US beet and 
Cuban sugar producers, proposes alternatively that the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Administration was pressured by beet sugar interests to adopt the quota system. 
Since the passage of the Smoot-Hawley tariff, the reigning protection had displa-
ced Cuban sugar, but the protection, aimed to benefit beet sugar, in effect failed 
to remove beet sugar’s competition. Instead, it stimulated the expansion of sugar 
production in the insular possessions. Deducing that the quota would provide 
firmer protection for high-cost domestic beet sugar, Santamaría concludes that 
the alignment of interests of the domestic beet sugar and Cuba must have provi-
———— 
 9 A.O. KRUEGER [6], pp. 210-11. 
10 Ibidem, pp. 208-11. 
11 O. ZANETTI [2], p. 118. 
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ded the political pressure for the quota12. This reasoning did apply to the renewal 
of the quota program in 1937, after beet sugar producers learned that the program 
would be governed in their favor. However, testimony in public congressional 
hearings, as well as extensive archival records, show that it did not apply in 1933 
and 1934. Beet sugar initially fiercely opposed the quota and, then, argued that 
Cuba’s participation in it should be residual13. 
These contributions are, nonetheless, consistent with the predominant view in 
the Cuban historiography is that the quota system was beneficial to Cuba, or at 
least benign. This view is based on three observations. First, since 1925, the world 
sugar market was characterized by an unprecedented accumulation of physical 
stocks —a fact that was shared by many other commodity markets, which C. Kind-
leberger emphasized as an important antecedent to the world financial crisis of the 
1930s14. As early as the zafra of 1926/27, Cuba unilaterally imposed quantity res-
trictions on its own production and began trying to coordinate worldwide quantity 
restriction in attempt to stabilize the sugar market. In 1931, Cuba and eight other 
countries formed an international cartel that established export quotas to the non-
US world market —that is, the portion not behind prohibitive protectionist walls15. 
In 1930, private representatives of the Cuban sugar industry reached a «gentle-
man’s agreement» with US domestic producers —a cartel agreement to reduce 
supplies to the US market, but it proved unenforceable. 
In this respect, the introduction of the US sugar quota system has been inter-
preted as a favorable action at least to the island’s sugar interests, which had 
sought such measures for years. The quota Cuba received was considerably less 
than its historical share of the US market; however, the US sugar tariff was per-
ceived to be endogenous. Key players predicted that, if Cuba’s exports to the 
United States remained unchecked, political pressures for increased tariffs might 
go so far as to eliminate Cuba’s share of the US market. 
Second, in the 1903 reciprocity treaty, Cuba had received a 20 percent dis-
count on the US sugar tariff. The preferential tariff was intended at that time as a 
mechanism to allow Cuban producers to capture some of the rents from the pro-
tected US sugar market for rebuilding its war-torn economy. That is, it aimed to 
allow Cuban producers to appropriate a portion of the differential between the 
———— 
12 A. SANTAMARÍA [2], p. 225. 
13 See U.S. TARIFF COMMISION, Sugar. Report to the President of the United States. Differen-
ces in costs of production of sugar in the United States and in the chief competing country, Was-
hingon D.C., Government Printing Office, 1934; J. DALTON, Sugar: A Case of Government Con-
trol, New York, Macmillan, 1937, and A.O. KRUEGER [6]. 
14 C. KINDLEBERGER, The World in Depression 1929-1939, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1973. 
15 A.D. DYE and R. SICOTTE, «How Brinkmanship Saved Chadbourne: Credibility and the In-
ternational Sugar Agreement of 1931», New York, Working paper presented at the «Columbia 
University Seminar in Economic History», Oct., 3, 2002 (http://econ.barnard.columbia.edu/~econhist/ 
papers/Dye_Sicotte_brinkmanship.pdf). 
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Raw Sugar Prices in New York and London
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protected US price and the world price. Yet by 1909, by which time Cuban ex-
ports to the US had competed away all other foreign competition, no such gap 
existed because the differential between the market-clearing price in the protec-
ted US market and the world market was the Cuban tariff. With the aim of allo-
wing Cuban producers to recapture a portion of that differential, the 1934 quota 
legislation included a reduction in the tariff on Cuban sugar, and the new recipro-
city treaty of 1934, reduced the tariff on Cuban sugar. Figure 1 shows the effect 
that the combination of the quota and the lowering of the tariff had on the price 
of sugar received in Cuba. It rose above the world-market-clearing (London) 
price and approached the protected US price, stopping when the distance between 
the Cuban and US prices was equal to the tariff. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Raw sugar prices in New Cork and London, 1927-1939  
(cents per lb., 96º pol., CIB basis)* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* London prices are expressed en cents US per lb. using exchange rate conversion. NY Cubas are 
for sugar in Havana for prompt delivery to New York. The prices is quoted CIF New York but ex-
cludes the duty. 
Sources: WILLETT AND GRAY, «Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle», The Saturday Times of London, 1927-1939. 
 
 
Third, the lack of economic diversification in Cuba, and principally its de-
pendence on sugar, may be seen as its greatest structural problem. Therefore, 
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some historians interpret any policy that should reduce its reliance on sugar, and 
on the US market, and possibly stimulate economic diversification, as beneficial. 
 
 
THE CRISIS IN US SUGAR MARKET 
 
The US sugar market was supplied by eight major supplier groups with three 
broad political identities. (i) The targeted constituents of sugar protection policy 
were the mainland —the beet and cane sugar industries. (ii) An intermediate sup-
plier group did not have representation in Congress but was given duty-free sta-
tus were the insular possessions —the territory of Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Phi-
lippines, and the Virgin Islands. (iii) Foreign suppliers paid the US sugar tariff. 
Although, among these, Cuba was distinct because the tariff preferential it recei-
ved had permitted Cuba to take over virtually all sugar imports into the US from 
foreign suppliers. This does not, however, mean that Cuban sugar production was 
inefficient. Cuba produced 1-2 million tons beyond what it sold in the United 
States, which it sold competitively on the world market. Contemporary interna-
tional cost surveys in the 1920s showed that Cuba and Java had the lowest per 
unit raw sugar costs in the world16. A fourth concentrated interest group were the 
refiners, who were the most concentrated among the consumers of imported su-
gar. Up to 1930, the tariff differential between raw and refined sugar almost fully 
protected refined sugar in the United States such that imports were of raw sugar 
(the differential was reduced with the Hawley-Smoot tariff legislation, which 
caused refiners to call for protection against a shift in import at the margins from 
raw to refined sugar after 1930). 
Table 1 summarizes the total consumption and allocation of market shares in 
the US sugar market. It shows that in the 1920s, the mainland share of the US 
sugar market (beet and cane together) averaged 19 percent, which rose to 27 per-
cent in the 1930s. The share of the market going to the US insular possessions 
(Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Philippines) rose from 24 to 43 
percent. The foreign share, almost all from Cuba, fell from 39 to 18 percen. 
The lower panel of Table 1 focuses on the changes in sales volumes for each 
supplier group after 1929. Sugar consumption in the United States peaked in 
1929 at 7.59 million short tons. By 1933, it had fallen by 17 percent —1.26 mi-
llion tons less than in 1929. The decline was not shared among the supplier 
groups. Despite the decline in consumption, all protected areas expanded their 
production and sales during the Depression. By 1935, US mainland sales volu-
———— 
16 See H.C. PRINSEN GEERLIGS et al., Sugar: Memoranda Prepared for the Economic Commit-
tee, Geneva, Series of League of Nations Publications, C.148.M.57; Economic and Financial, 
1929.II.20, and F. MAXWELL, Economic Aspects of Cane Sugar Production, London, Norman 
Rodger, 1927. 
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Mainland Insular Possessions Foreign  
Beet Cane Hawaii Puerto Rico
Virgin
Islands
Philippines Cuba Other Total 
000s short tons 
1905 335 390 416 136  39 1029 773 3118 
1910 546 355 555 285  88 1755 205 3789 
1915 935 139 640 294  163 2392 155 4718 
1920 1165 176 550 413 13 146 2881 993 6337 
1925 977 142 755 600 11 493 3923 33 6934 
1929 1089 218 882 507 3 711 4149 28 7587 
1930 1293 215 868 809 6 794 2645 53 6683 
1931 1343 206 998 796 2 872 2482 28 6727 
1932 1319 160 1048 940 5 1028 1791 12 6303 
1933 1366 315 990 793 5 1249 1573 40 6331 
1934 1562 268 948 807 5 1088 1866 30 6574 
1935 1478 319 927 793 2 917 1830 11 6277 
1936 1364 409 1033 907 4 985 2102 29 6833 
1937 1245 491 985 896 8 991 2155 89 6860 
1938 1448 449 906 815 4 981 1941 75 6619 
1939 1809 587 966 1126 6 980 1930 62 7466 
Growth index 1929 = 100 
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1930 118.7 98.6 98.4 159.6 200.0 111.7 63.8 189.3 88.1 
1931 123.3 94.5 113.2 157.0 66.7 122.6 59.8 100.0 88.7 
1932 121.1 73.4 118.8 185.4 166.7 144.6 43.2 42.9 83.1 
1933 125.4 144.5 112.2 156.4 166.7 175.7 37.9 142.9 83.4 
1934 143.4 122.9 107.5 159.2 166.7 153.0 45.0 107.1 86.6 
1935 135.7 146.3 105.1 156.4 66.7 129.0 44.1 39.3 82.7 
1936 125.3 187.6 117.1 178.9 133.3 138.5 50.7 103.6 90.1 
1937 114.3 225.2 111.7 176.7 266.7 139.4 51.9 317.9 90.4 
1938 133.0 206.0 102.7 160.7 133.3 138.0 46.8 267.9 87.2 
1939 166.1 269.3 109.5 222.1 200.0 137.8 46.5 221.4 98.4 
mes had increased by 45 percent, insular possessions by 35 percent; and foreign 
suppliers’ volumes were reduced by 55 percent. The domestic sales of no other 
major agricultural commodity in the United States expanded during this period. 
 
 
TABLE 1 
US sugar consumption, supplier area contributions, 
and their relative growth, 1905-1929 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: U.S. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, History and Operations of the U.S. 
Sugar Program, Washington D.C., 87th Congress, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962. 
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One view holds that the gains registered by the sugar industry during the De-
pression were a consequence of substantial increases in the sugar tariff in the 
Fordney-McCumber (1922) and Hawley-Smoot (1930) tariff acts, and that the 
Sugar Control Act of 1934 was intended to correct those excesses. Yet the figures 
in Table 1 show that the 1934 legislation did not reverse the effective protection. 
Two protected supplier groups stand out in particular. By 1939, the cane sugar 
producers in the mainland (Louisiana and Florida) and Puerto Rico each more 
than doubled their sales volumes, relative to 1929. The domestic (mainland and 
insular) expansion was made possible by a spectacular fall in the sugar imports 
from Cuba. By 1933, Cuban exports of sugar had fallen by more than 2.5 million 
tons, to 47 percent of what it had exported in 1929. Because the price also fell 
and the tariff was increased, Cuba’s earnings from the US market fell even more 
abruptly. Observation of real export revenues shows a similar pattern. By 1933, 
they fell to less than 30 percent of their 1929 level. Afterwards, Cuba’s export 
volumes leveled off even as US sugar demand began to recover after 1935, whe-
reas revenues from domestic sugar sales were up from 1929 levels in all domestic 
supplier groups. In short, despite falling demand for sugar during the economic 
crisis in the United States, all domestic supplier groups increased both sales vo-
lumes and revenues, and the expansion came at Cuba’s expense. 
It is difficult to overstate the severity of the consequences of the loss of mar-
ket share and export revenue on the Cuban economy. Eighty percent or more of 
Cuba’s exports consisted of sugar, and more than half of it was exported to the 
United States. By the 1950s, it is estimated that 25-30 percent of Cuba’s national 
income was accounted for in its gross earnings from sugar exports to the United 
States17. Furthermore, the nation’s ability to substitute out of the US sugar market 
was limited by widespread protection of sugar worldwide. Cuba's access to the 
other major sugar-consuming countries, except Great Britain, was more restricted 
than its access to the US market18. 
The downward shock reverberated in Cuba’s national economy. From 1929 to 
1932, (according to the best estimate) national income fell by about 30 percent, and 
about 60 percent of that decline was explained by the 70 percent fall in sugar ex-
port earnings. Falling wages and shortened seasonal employment caused expected 
real income to sugar workers in 1932 to fall to somewhere between 13  and 14  of 
———— 
17 See A. SANTAMARÍA [2], O. ZANETTI [2], and J. ALIENES [2]. 
18 A further constraint was instituted in 1931, when Cuba became a signatory (and leading ad-
vocate) of the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) of 1931, a private cartel, that had implemented 
export quotas to try to stabilize the price of sugar on the depressed world market. The Cuban Go-
vernment had already instituted sugar controls for its own producers, and regulated the volume of 
sales going to the US, non-US, and home markets (see J. ÁLVAREZ DÍAZ et al., Un estudio sobre 
Cuba, Coral Gables, University of Miami Press, 1963). At the time the sugar law of 1934 was 
being deliberated, a one-ton expected reduction in Cuban exports to the United States would have 
to be answered with a one-ton reduction in sugar production. 
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1929 incomes. Studies show that other wages followed this downward path19. The 
collapse threw the working population into destitution and the nation into a social 
and political crisis. Violent labor unrest erupted in 1931, led to the overthrow of the 
Government in 1933, and plunged the country into political disorder. 
 
 
THE US SUGAR TARIFF 
 
Contemporary cost studies concluded that the displacement of Cuba’s share 
of the US sugar market was caused by the tariff, not competitive forces. The US 
Tariff Commission surveyed the costs production of all major supplier areas to 
the US sugar market in 1923 and 1933, and it found in both studies that Cuban 
costs of production were substantially lower than any of the other major supplier 
areas to the US market. The studies were consistent with international studies 
(cited above) which had shown Cuba to be one of the two lowest-cost sugar pro-
ducers in the world. In both Tariff Commission studies, the Commission recom-
mended reductions of the sugar tariff by 25 percent or more to maintain the pre-
vailing cost differential between US mainland and Cuban producers20. 
The significance of this, perhaps surprising, policy recommendation comes 
from the flexible tariff powers given the President under the 1922 tariff act. The 
President was given discretion to alter tariffs, otherwise fixed by the tariff schedu-
les of omnibus tariff legislation, in order to maintain the prevailing costs differen-
tials between US domestic producers and their chief foreign competitors. The Ta-
riff Commission was set up to study the cost differentials in protected industries 
and make recommendations21. Their findings on cost differentials give evidence for 
the cause of the shift in market shares from Cuba to domestic producers. They 
found that Cuba’s cost advantage over US domestic producers had improved over 
the decade —it had certainly not eroded. Furthermore, although the cost differen-
tial was substantial, they found that tariff protection was higher than necessary to 
maintain the prevailing cost differential, implying that the improved market share 
of domestic producers was caused by the increased protection22. 
———— 
19 See FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Problems of the New Cuba, New York. J.J. Little & 
Ives Co., 1935. 
20 U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION [13], and Sugar, Report of the United States Tariff commission to 
the President of the United States. Differences in costs of production of sugar in the United States 
and Cuba, Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1926. 
21 Its recommendation to reduce the sugar tariff in 1923 was not adopted. Its recommendation 
in 1933 concluded that the sugar industry was a special case in which the tariff as an instrument of 
protection was ineffective. Its recommendation to replace the sugar tariff with a quota system was 
one of the prime reasons the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration focused its efforts on the quota, 
as explained below J. DALTON [13]. 
22 See U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION [13 and 20], J. DALTON [13], and R.A. BALLINGER, A History 
of Sugar Marketing, Washington D.C., U.S. Depatment of Agriculture, Economic Research Servi-
ce, Agricultural Economic Report, nº 197, Feb. 1971. 
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TABLE 2 
US sugar tariff of Cuban Sugar, 1898-1934 
 
Year introduced Tariff on Cuban raw sugar at 96° pol. (cents per lb.) 
Ad valorem equivalent over period 
in effect (percent annual average) 
1898 1.6850 71.8 
1903 1.3480 a 51.3 
1913 1.0048 20.3 
1921 1.6000 53.7 
1922 1.7648 68.8 
1930 2.0000 167.1 
1934 0.9000 b 40.2 
a From 1903, the tariff figures given incorporate the 20 percent discount Cuba received on the full 
sugar duty. 
b The quantity restrictions were suspended between September and December of 1939 in response 
to hoarding at the breakout of hostilities in Europe. Under the reciprocity treaty of 1934, the tariff 
on Cuban raws of 0.9 cents per lb. rose to 1.5 cents per lb. if or when quotas were lifted. 
Source: Cuba Económica y Financiera, Anuario Azucarero de Cuba, La Habana, Cuba Económica 
y Financiera, 1940. 
 
 
The depression explains a large part of the loss of sales and revenues, but the 
main cause of the loss of Cuba’s market share was the sugar tariff. Before the 
trade reforms of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration, tariff policy was one 
of the primary issues dividing the major political parties. Republicans were pro-
tectionist and Democrats were relatively «free traders». Tariff rates oscillated as 
both parties, when in the majority, used omnibus tariff legislation to move tariff 
rates in their preferred directions23. Table 2 shows how the sugar tariff followed 
the general fluctuation in tariff rates. Republicans consecutively passed consecu-
tive protectionist tariff bills in 1922 and 1930. The Fordney-McCumber Act of 
1922 boosted the 1921 increase in the tariff on Cuban raw sugar, setting it signi-
ficantly at 1.7648 cents per lb. —75 percent higher than the prewar rate. Though 
the 1922 increase introduced the largest absolute increase, the increase to 2 cents 
on Cuban raw sugar, enacted with the Hawley-Smoot Act of 1930, had a greater 
effect at the margin. In another paper we uses cost estimates from the Tariff 
Commission survey to show that despite the substantial increase in the tariff24, 
most Cuban mills remained competitive because of the large cost advantage they 
———— 
23 See M. BAILEY, J. GOLDSTEIN and B. WEINGAST, «The Institutional Roots of American Tra-
de Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade», World Politics, 49, Baltimore, 1977, pp. 
309-38; J. Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
1993, and R.A. BALLINGER [22]. 
24 A.D. DYE, «The US Sugar Tariff and the Cuban Revolution of 1933», Working Paper, 
Western Economic Association Meetings, San Diego, CA, July 6-10, 1999. 
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had over the majority of the US domestic industry25. However, the 1930 increase 
of 2 cents pushed the majority of Cuban mills below the breakeven threshold. 
High fixed costs, however, determined that most mills remained active26. 
 
 
THE QUOTA SYSTEM 
 
What were the rules set up to implement and govern the new policy? How 
did they function? Do these features offer insights into the intent of the policy, 
according to those who established it? Sugar controls in the United States were 
introduced under the Sugar Control Act, also known as the Jones-Costigan Act, 
of 1934. In effect, it amended the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 to add 
sugar beets and sugar cane to a list of products, including wheat, corn, cotton, 
and tobacco, that were designated as «basic agricultural commodities», which 
made them available for the application of certain price stabilization measures 
provided under the law to be administered under the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration (AAA), created for that purpose. 
Besides placing sugar under the AAA, it provided a formula for determining the 
quantity restrictions on domestic production and import quotas on Cuban and other 
foreign sugar. The quotas were assigned on two levels: first, each of the major sup-
plier groups —mainland beet, mainland cane, each insular possession, Cuba, and 
other foreign suppliers were assigned specific overall group quotas; then, separate 
arrangements were made within each domestic group, including crop curtailment 
contracts with individual growers of beet or cane and «marketing» (sales) quotas for 
each processor. The act gave the Secretary of Agriculture complete discretion for 
setting the latter, but it restricted how the supplier groups’ marketing and import 
quotas were determined. Mainland beet and cane areas were given fixed quotas of 
1.55 and 0.26 million short tons. Also, the mainland was guaranteed 30 percent of 
any growth in total US consumption exceeding 6.452 million short tons. The re-
mainder was to be apportioned between the insular possessions and foreigners on 
the basis of historical sales levels determined by the Secretary of Agriculture27. Na-
———— 
25 Contrary to what many have presumed, the tariff increase was not a reaction to the stock 
market crash or subsequent events associated with the Great Depression. Though the law went into 
effect in June of 1930, the sugar tariff had been virtually decided by the fall of 1929, before crash 
in October 1929. Furthermore, studies of the political economy of Hawley-Smoot show conclusive-
ly that the tariff law would have passed even if the Depression had not occurred. See A.D. DYE and 
R. SICOTTE, «The Institutional Determinants of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff», Working Paper, New 
York, 2001 (http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/rs/Institutional%20Determinants.pdf). 
26 There was massive bankruptcy of Cuban sugar mills, but most were reorganized and put 
back into production as creditors tried to recover their losses. 
27 See J. DALTON [13] and H.A. WOLF, The United States Sugar Policy and its Impact upon 
Cuba: A Reappraisal, Ph.D. dis., Michigan, University of Michigan. 
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turally, the allocation of the overall quotas to individual foreign producers was 
done within each country’s political institutions. 
Cuba had agreed to limit its exports of sugar to the US in 1930 as part of a 
Gentlemen’s (cartel) agreement; furthermore, it participated in an international 
cartel formed in 1931, which restricted exports to non-US markets, known as the 
Chadbourne Agreement28. The Cuban Sugar Stabilization Institute, set up to im-
plement the crop restriction and export controls since 1931 under the Chadbourne 
Agreement, thus predated US sugar controls. 
Since the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)’s estimate of overall sugar 
demand, given the target price, could be off, or supplier groups could fall short of 
their quotas, provisions were also made for adjustments and reassignment of de-
ficits. Table 3 gives the proposed quotas at various stages of the legislative pro-
cess, and the initial quotas for 1934-1938. The Sugar Act was renewed in 1937, 
when the formula for determining the quotas was revised. In 1937, each supplier 
group was allotted a fixed share of the USDA’s estimate of demand, given its 
price target, except that domestic producers jointly were guaranteed a minimum 
of 3.715 million short tons29. 
Several observations about the 1934 quota assignments are noteworthy. The 
fixed quota for mainland beet sugar was not intended to be binding for the first few 
years at least; it was set at 20 percent higher than the average annual sales for 
1931-1933, and 13 percent above its historical peak in 1933. Though less generous, 
the mainland cane quota was also not intended to be restrictive. It exceeded its an-
nual average sales for 1931-1933 by 12 percent. The beet sugar industry did not 
fulfill its quota in any year prior to World War II. Mainland cane did grow to ex-
ceed its quota, regularly picking up part of the beet-sugar deficits; but Congress 
promptly expanded its quota by 70 percent in the 1937 revision of the sugar law. 
By contrast, the 1934 law expressly confined other groups to historical levels. 
The letter of the law obscures some of the constraints. Nominally, it gave much 
discretion to the Secretary of Agriculture to determine the «representative» histo-
rical levels for the other groups. It instructed that he could use historical sales 
from any three consecutive years between 1925 and 1933 inclusive. However, the 
director of the Sugar Section of the AAA described later that the discretion was 
illusory, since the Secretary also (i) had to limit aggregate sales to a level that 
would prevent a further price decline, and (ii) he was constrained by implicit ex-
pectations, held by members of Congress, about the distribution of quotas that were 
not written into the legislation. These involved promises made by Congressmen to 
constituents in order to obtain their support for the legislation30. If the Secretary 
used his discretion in ways that violated these implicit constraints, Congress would 
———— 
28 A.D. DYE and R. SICOTTE [15]. 
29 H.A. WOLF [31]. 
30 J. DALTON [13]. 
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Initial quotas 
Quotas proposed 
in the industry's 
voluntary
marketing
agreement, Sept. 
1933
Quotas
proposed by 
Roosevelt to 
Congress in 
April 1934 
Quota under 
the formula 
given in the 
1934 Sugar 
Act
Quotas for 
1937 based on 
the fixed 
shares under 
the 1937 
revision
a
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Mainland beet 1750 1450 1550 1633 1556 1550 1550 1417 1591
Mainland cane 310 260 260 443 261 260 260 472 431
Hawaii 975 935 971 989 948 926 941 984 963
Puerto Rico 875 821 843 841 807 788 801 897 819
Virgin Is. 15 5 4 9 5 5 5 10 9
Philippines 1100 1037 1050 1085 1006 982 998 998 1057
Cuba 1700 1944 1949 2014 1866 1823 1853 2149 1963
Other foreign — — 27 28 26 25 26 115 27
Total mainland 2060 1710 1810 2076 1817 1810 1810 1889 2023
Total insular 1865 1761 1818 1839 2766 2701 2746 2890 2849
Total foreign 1700 1944 1975 2042 1892 1848 1878 2264 1990
Total 6725 6452 6653 7043 6476 6359 6434 7043 6862
be inclined to remove his powers. Secretary Henry Wallace chose the years 1931-
1933 as «representative» for all except Hawaii, for which he used 1930-193231. 
This decision had the effect of maximizing the quotas for Puerto Rico and the Phi-
lippines, setting Hawaii’s at 4 percent below maximum, and minimizing Cuba’s 
quota, within the constraints of the rules provided in the law. 
 
 
TABLE 3 
US Sugar Cuota Proposals, Formulas, and Assignement, 
1934-1937 (000s short tons, raw valor) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a Quotas for 1937 were proportional to estimated total US consumption. Quotas presented here are 
given assuming the USDA’s initial estimate of total US sugar consumption for 1937 
Sources: WILLETT AND GRAY, Weekly Statistical Sugar Trade Journal, Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, The Saturday Times of London, 1927-1939; H.A. WOLF, The United States Sugar Policy 
and its Impact upon Cuba: A Reappraisal, Ph.D. dis., Michigan, University of Michigan; M. 
LYNSKY, Sugar Economics, Statistics, and Documents, New York, U.S. Cane Sugar Refiners' As-
sociation, 1938; J. BERNHARDT, The Sugar Industry and the Federal Government: A Thirty Year 
Record (1917-47), Washington D.C., Sugar Statistics Service, 1948, and J. DALTON, Sugar: A Case 
of Government Control, New York, Macmillan, 1937. 
 
To offset some of the deterioration in the Cuban economy that this otherwise 
would make permanent, Franklin D. Roosevelt used presidential powers under 
———— 
31 This reduced Hawaii’s quota by about 4 percent relative to what it would have received if 
the Secretary had used the same years as the others for its standard. 
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the flexible tariff provision of the Tariff Act of 1922 to lower the tariff on Cuban 
sugar to 1.5 cents per lb. Simultaneously, a new US-Cuban trade reciprocity trea-
ty was negotiated, which gave more concessions to US farm and manufactured 
exports to Cuba in exchange for an additional reduction in the Cuban sugar tariff 
to 0.9 cents. 
 
 
INVESTORS’ PERCEPTIONS 
 
What does the quantitative record tell us about its intent? Does the record of 
who benefited give insight into its original intent? One way to observe the effects 
is through examination of the stock prices of sugar companies. Investors in sugar 
companies responded quickly to any new information about policy and formula-
ted new expectations about the expected returns and risk in each of the supplier 
groups. Stock prices thus rapidly incorporated the expected effects from the poli-
cy regime change. Indices of stock prices for each region, therefore, serve as in-
dicators of the expected performance of the sugar industries in each of the consti-
tuent supplier areas. 
Using a database of weekly stock prices of sugar companies from 1921 to 
1941, traded on the New York Stock Exchange, curb, and over-the-counter mar-
kets (collected as part of a joint project with R. Sicotte), I have computed indices 
of stock prices for sugar companies located in the mainland beet sugar sector, 
Puerto Rico, and Cuba32. The indices consist of five mainland beet direct-
consumption sugar producers, four Puerto Rican raw cane sugar producers, and 
seven Cuban raw cane sugar producers. Indices for each for these supplier groups 
were weighted by the total capital stock reported for each company33. 
The indices, displayed in Figure 2, confirm expectations but also offer new 
insights into the relative effects of program on the various supplier areas. First, 
the drop in 1921 and 1922 reflects the aftermath of postwar adjustment caused by 
the lifting of wartime sugar price controls in 1919. The recovery of the US main-
land coincided with tariff increases in 1921 and 1922, whose timing were are also 
explained in part by the postwar adjustment crisis. In Cuba, the postwar adjust-
ment crisis was particularly severe, resulting in widespread bankruptcies of sugar 
mills and bank closures34. However, the recovery was equally extraordinary be-
———— 
32 The data are end-of-week series collected from the Wall Street Journal, New York, and the 
New York Times, New York. 
33 Benchmarks for the weights were 1926, 1929, 1935, and 1939. 
34 See H.C. WALLICH, Monetary Problems of an Export Economy: The Cuban Experience 
1914-1947, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960 (1th ed. in Spanihs, La Habana, 
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 1953), and E. COLLAZO, Una pelea cubana contra los monopolios (un 
estudio sobre el crac bancario de 1920), Gijón, Vicerrectorado de Relaciones Institucionales, Uni-
versidad de Oviedo, 1994. 
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cause a large number of projects investing in new sugar mill technology, begun 
for the wartime expansion, were completed in the early and middle 1920s.35 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Sugar-company stock price indices for the US mainland (beet sugar), 
Puerto Rico, and Cuba, 1921-1943* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Individual company stock prices are scaled to equal 100 on the date the Smoot-Hawley tariff went 
into effect, June 17, 1930. 
Sources: See text. 
 
 
The slow, steady climb of the Puerto Rican index after 1922 reflects the be-
ginning of a wave of investment in new sugar milling technology that was stimu-
lated by the increased competitiveness against Cuba, due to increased protection 
under the tariff increases. The climb is slow because, prior to the war, unlike Cu-
ba, there had been little investment in new sugar milling technology in Puerto 
Rico, where land availability and soil qualities were better than the mainland but 
not as favorable as in Cuba. Prior to the war, sugar had been scheduled for mo-
vement to the free list, but during the war that policy change became politically 
impossible. After the war, the increases in the sugar tariff signaled that sugar 
———— 
35 A.D. DYE, Cuban Sugar in the Age of Mass Production: Technology and the Economics of 
the Cuban Sugar Central, 1899-1929, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998. 
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would go onto the free list and made expansion of sugar milling capacity in Puer-
to Rico more attractive36. 
All three indices drop in response to the collapse of the sugar market from 
1929 to 1932. Mainland and insular-possession stocks begin to recover signifi-
cantly in early 1933. The most likely explanation is the expected passage of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act because of the anticipated positive effects to the 
industry of measures to stabilize the price of sugar and subsidize beet and cane 
growers. The early upswing in 1933 needs some explanation, since sugar beets 
and sugarcane were not designated as «basic agricultural commodities» until the 
passage of the Jones-Costigan Act in May 1934. In fact, the passage was not the 
first attempt by the Administration to take measures to reform the sugar industry. 
As explained below, efforts to create an orderly marketing agreement began in 
early 1933, and although the designation of sugar as a «basic agricultural com-
modity» increases the Administration’s controls over form that controls took, it 
was not necessary for an agreement to be established under the AAA legislation. 
The swift but steady decline of the Cuban sugar-company stock index until about 
1932 and 1933, where it leveled off, is consistent with the fixing of Cuba’s quota 
at its minimum historical market share (of 1931-1933)37. One might have expec-
ted some recovery from the lowering of the tariff, but since most sugar compa-
nies operating in Cuba were bankrupt or threatened with bankruptcy, creditors 
had large claims on any surpluses, and common stockholders, last in line, were 
unlikely to be paid dividends. Scarcely any dividends were paid on Cuban sugar 
company shares in the 1930s.38 
 
———— 
36 Correctly anticipating the trend in protectionism in the 1920s, some prominent sugar refiner 
interests began to shift their vertically integrated investments in raw sugar capacity away from 
Cuba to develop state-of-the-art operations in Puerto Rico. See J. DALTON [13], A. GAYER et al., 
The Sugar Economy of Porto Rico, New York, Columbia University Press, 1938, and R.A. BA-
LLINGER [22]. 
37 The temporary rise in 1937 is probably explained by improved optimism about the possibi-
lity of recovery of the US economy and the sugar market. The reversal of that movement in 1938 
appears to reflect a return of expectations to their former state. However, the downward trend in 
Cuban sugar company stock prices began in 1924 or 1925. 
38 Several factors help to explain why that did not boost stock prices. Sugar milling involves 
significant fixed costs, and Cuban mills were operating well below capacity, which meant higher 
unit costs of production. Maintenance of the cost advantage, which they had relied on in the 1920s 
to compete in the protected US market, depended on higher capacity utilization than mills could 
achieve under current market and regulatory conditions. In the long run, Cuba might have increased 
capacity utilization rates by allowed mills to close, thus reducing the aggregate milling capacity. 
But instead, the Cuban Government maintained a policy that preserved the excess aggregate milling 
capacity by allocating quotas proportionately to all existing mills (Cuban Economic Research Pro-
ject 1963). Since the crisis, most Cuban sugar companies had gone bankrupt, and were under credi-
tor or judicial oversight. They almost ceased paying dividends during the 1930s (Farr and Co., 
Fitch, Standard and Poor). 
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«BENEVOLENT GUARDIAN» OR MULTIDIMENSIONALITY? 
 
Returning to the question of original intent of the Sugar Program, the quantita-
tive evidence from the stock price indices shows that, if the program was designed 
to help Cuba, its effectiveness was strictly limited. The quota benefited Cuba only 
in the sense that it put a floor on Cuba’s falling market share in the US sugar mar-
ket. Yet it also committed Cuba to a share of the US sugar market determined by 
its pre-quota historical minimum39. The quota-assignment rules clearly targeted 
mainland sugar interests. Neither was the program primarily installed for Cuba’s 
benefit, nor did it benefit Cuba de facto, except in a limited sense. 
Yet if these observations are correct, what led A.O. Krueger to conclude, on 
the one hand, that 
 
«The ‘benevolent guardian’ […] theory of governmental behaviour seems 
to conform reasonably well to the motives of the Roosevelt Administration in 
1934 […]»40, 
 
and on the other, that interest-group politics does not help to them? She drew 
primarily from statements of US Government officials to the press and testimony 
of interest-group representatives before Congress. Official statements of the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration connected the program with the collapse of 
the Gerardo Machado regime in 1933 and expressed the Administration preferen-
ce to limit the expansion of the high-cost domestic sugar industry. Meanwhile, 
domestic sugar producers voiced strong opposition to Roosevelt’s proposal in the 
Congressional public hearings in April to consider including sugar as a «basic 
agricultural commodity» in the AAA41. 
Yet additional context puts a different light on these statements. First, many 
on both sides of the debate had decided by 1933 that the tariff had «failed» as a 
protective instrument for sugar. This thinking was prompted by a Tariff Commis-
sion study in 1933 that found (i) that the sugar tariff served to stimulate the insu-
lar possessions rather than protect mainland industry, thus shifting but not elimi-
nating its competition. Evidence from the last two tariff increases, in 1922 and 
1930, showed that the principal beneficiaries of protection were Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines, both of which expanded substantially under increased protection. 
(ii) Furthermore, the Commission found that Cuba’s economy was so dependent 
———— 
39 The reduction in the tariff was an important part of the package. It permitted Cuban produ-
cers to obtain some of the economic rents of the program and produced a partial recovery of sugar 
export revenues. This may be seen as constituting aid to Cuba at a time of crisis, but it did not come 
without a cost. The reduction was part of a reciprocity treaty that included broad concessions to 
exports of US farm products and manufactures to Cuba. Some historians criticize it as costly to 
Cuba because it constrained the economy’s ability to diversify out of sugar. See O. ZANETTI [2]. 
40 A.O. KRUEGER [6], p. 208. 
41 Ibid., pp. 180-1. 
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on the US sugar market that its sugar production costs were endogenous to the 
US sugar tariff. Past increases in the tariff were met with substantial wage reduc-
tions in Cuba. Further increases, the Commission predicted, would drive wages 
down further and intensify the political instability in Cuba. 
The two findings together led the Commission to conclude that an increase in 
the tariff would not offer lasting protection for mainland sugar producers. Rather, 
it would encourage further expansion of production in the insular possessions 
(which were not the intended target of the protection); the increased competition 
from the insular possessions would cause mainland producers to press for further 
protection against Cuba imports, which would have serious destabilizing conse-
quences to this important trading partner and political ally42. The Tariff Commis-
sion report, therefore, rejected the tariff as the preferred instrument for the sugar 
industry and, instead, proposed the alternative of a system of import quotas. This 
instrument had been growing in popularity in Europe for addressing the chaotic 
trade conditions since the crisis, when fluctuations in terms of trade and real ex-
change rates made it difficult to adjust specific tariff rates frequently enough to 
keep them effective43. It also recommended a reduction of the tariff on Cuban 
sugar, but it had been making that recommendation for a decade. 
It was not insignificant that the Tariff Commission’s recommendation fit well 
into the Administration’s existing programs for trade reform and agricultural 
relief. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration stood on a platform of trade 
liberalization, and it was in the midst of a major legislative reform, the Recipro-
cal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA), that finally passed both houses in June 1934. 
Discussion already was under way concerning a possible revision of the trade 
reciprocity treaty with Cuba, which contemplated a reduction in the sugar tariff, 
in exchange for preferential tariff reductions for a wide range of US exports to 
Cuba, a particularly important market for US agricultural exports. The reciprocity 
treaty was celebrated as the first in a series of bilateral treaties to be negotiated 
under the RTAA aimed at stimulating US exports44. 
Farm relief was another of the salient political issues that the incoming Fran-
klin D. Roosevelt Administration tackled. The AAA thus became a central com-
ponent of the New Deal package. A complex program of agricultural price stabi-
lization, it radically departed from the previous Herbert Hoover Administration’s 
attempt to use increased protection as the principle instrument of farm relief. The 
Democratic landslide in the presidential election in 1932 was, in part, a conse-
quence of the failure of the Republican policy toward farm relief. The Roosevelt 
Administration took the position that, as a measure of farm relief, the Hawley-
———— 
42 See J. DALTON [13], and U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION [13]. 
43 H. HEUSER, Control of International Trade, London, Rouletge & Sons, 1939. 
44 W. LEUCHTENBERG, Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal: 1932-1940, New York, Harper 
& Row, 1963, p. 204. 
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Smoot tariff debacle had failed to provide relief to farmers. If anything, it hurt 
farm interests, since it was blamed for retaliatory protection enacted by importers 
of US farm products. In this respect, the RTAA and the AAA were connected. 
The US Sugar Program and the Cuban reciprocity treaty were instituted as a part 
of a grand New Deal trade reform and agricultural stabilization agenda. 
Cuban support for the trade concessions to the US that would be required for 
the Reciprocity Treaty were, in part, because the issue of trade reciprocity was 
tied to the proposal to abrogate the Platt Amendment. Meanwhile, representatives 
of the Cuban sugar industry favored the combination of an import quota and a 
reduction of the sugar tariff over the status quo. If import competition was cons-
trained by quantity restrictions, the reduction of the tariff would allow Cuban 
producers to appropriate part of the rents from the protected US sugar market. 
Contrast this with the perceived status quo. The US Tariff Commission had 
shown the simultaneous endogeneity of sugar tariff and costs of production in 
Cuba. Cuban sugar producers had understood for years concerns that the US su-
gar tariff was endogenous to competition from Cuba. Since the mid-1920s va-
rious representatives of the industry had made attempts to come to agreement 
with US mainland industry leaders to mitigate this problem. Under the current 
conditions, concerns were expressed that, if the tariff remained the instrument of 
protection, Cuba’s share of the US market could be driven to zero45. John Lee 
Coulter, of the US Tariff Commission, predicted that even under the current tariff 
rate, established in 1930, Cuba’s share of the US market would likely fall to 0.5 
to 0.8 million short tons, significantly less than its peak of 4.1 million in 1929 or 
its 1933 exports to the US of 1.5 million. José M. Casanova, then President of the 
Hacendados Association, similarly predicted that, without the inauguration of the 
quota system, within three years, Cuba would have ceased to have access to the 
US sugar market due to rising tariffs46. Manuel Rionda made a similar prediction 
occasionally in his private consultations with businessmen47. 
Therefore, there were several domestically motivated reasons why the Tariff 
Commission’s to abandon the tariff as the instrument to protect sugar was taken 
up by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Soon after the Tariff Commission report 
came out in June 1933, he called for sugar industry representatives to negotiate a 
«voluntary marketing agreement» under powers authorized by the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, and he appointed John Lee Coulter to coordinate the negotia-
tions. The Agricultural Adjustment Act authorized the President to pursue two 
approaches to negotiate industry-specific, voluntary stabilization programs. (i) 
For commodities designated as a «basic agricultural commodities», the AAA 
———— 
45 Braga Brothers Collection, papers of Manuel Rionda, University Archives, University of 
Florida at Gaineseville, Record Group 2, Series 10C. 
46 O. ZANETTI [2], p. 119. 
47 «Letter from Jefferson Caffery to Sumner Welles, US Ambassador to Cuba, Sept. 28, 
1933», U.S. National Archives, Record Group (USNA R.G.), 59, 811.6135/77a. 
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negotiated contracts with farmers to curtail crop, compensating them out of a 
«processing tax» on the industry. (ii) For sugar, which was not originally listed as 
a basic agricultural commodity, an alternative approach allowed federal spon-
sorship of industry-specific «voluntary marketing agreements», which could be 
enforced using federal licensing powers. In September 1933, sugar-industry re-
presentatives signed a voluntary agreement that apportioned the industry accor-
ding to a proposed set of quotas. In the negotiations from June to August, beet 
sugar interests presented one of the biggest obstacles. On the one hand, they de-
manded a quota of 1.75 million tons. Obtaining that demand in the September 
agreement, they signed the agreement, revealing that they did not object to the 
principle of the quota system. However, when they faced opposition to it from 
the Roosevelt Administration, they demanded the adoption of a policy principle 
that gave priority to US domestic producers in the US market, insisting that Cu-
ba’s access conditional upon domestic industry’s needs being met first48. 
So what was the domestic industry opposition, cited by A.O. Krueger, about? 
That testimony was made in opposition to the Franklin D. Roosevelt proposal 
before the House Committee on Agriculture in early 1934, after the voluntary 
agreement had been signed49. The Secretary of Agriculture summarily rejected 
the industry’s proposed agreement. A long list of reasons was given, but most 
significant was that the plan gave a monopoly position to processors, but the be-
nefits it would provide to farmers —the targeted group under the AAA— were 
indirect and uncertain50. So the Department of Agriculture rejected it and drew up 
a plan to include sugar beets and sugarcane as «basic agricultural commodities», 
which Roosevelt recommended to Congress in his April 1934 message51. Domes-
tic sugar’s opposition before Congress was against the proposed quotas, but they 
did not oppose the imposition of import quotas. 
The hard bargain that beet sugar interests drove is explained by their greater 
bargaining power. Since they were more geographically dispersed, they were better 
represented in Congress than other parties to the agreement. Beet sugar factories 
were located in fifteen states, and beet growers were sometimes also located in 
states adjacent to those where factories were located, whereas raw cane sugar was 
———— 
48 See T.J. HESTON, Sweet Subsidy: The Economic and Diplomatic Effects of the US Sugar Acts - 
1934 to 1974, Ph.D. diss, Cleveland, Case Western Reserve University, 1975, and J. DALTON [13]. 
49 A.O. KRUEGER [6]. 
50 It also gave an «extravagant» quota to beet sugar that was 40 percent above its 1931-1933 
average, plus increases of some size to all mainland and insular-possession producers, cutting Cu-
ba’s share to well below its historical minimum. J. BERNHARDT, The Sugar Industry and the Fede-
ral Government: A Thirty Year Record (1917-47), Washington D.C., Sugar Statistics Service, 1948, 
pp. 157-60, gives a matter-of-fact version of the criticisms. J. DALTON [13], pp. 81-9, argues that 
the official reasons were «not convincing» and provides a more in-depth explanation of the reasons 
behind the Administration’s decision. 
51 See Ibidem. 
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produced only in Louisiana and Florida52. Other supplier groups were not represen-
ted in Congress, but were confined to lobby only through relevant executive de-
partments. Archival records reveal, for examples, that an official from the Depart-
ment of the Interior acted as an advocate for the sugar interests in the territory of 
Hawaii; General Timothy Cox, of the War Department represented the Philippines 
in certain discussions; and US Ambassador to Cuba, Sumner Welles and other Sta-
te Department officials, intervened to advocate sugar interests in Cuba. 
Like most policies, one problem with identifying the primary objective of the 
Sugar Program is that multiple interests in the executive branch and in Congress 
sought control over the policy instrument. The Departments of Agriculture, State, 
Commerce and the Interior all were involved in the proceedings to reach an 
agreement with industry. The archival record shows that refiners and other repre-
sentatives of the Cuban industry worked behind the scenes with State Department 
personnel53. Interior officials advocated on behalf of insular possessions. Com-
merce was concerned about exporters. The RTAA, representing a major institutio-
nal reform of trade policy, had just been approved. Some scholars argue that this 
act introduced a significant institutional change in trade policy determination that 
caused the trade policy shift in the United States from protectionism to liberaliza-
tion. M. Bailey, J. Goldstein and B. Weingast, and D.A. Irwin and R. Kroszner 
argue that the key institutional change was the replacement of legislative deter-
mination of trade policy through omnibus tariff packages, which favored special-
interest protectionist coalitions, with greater presidential control over trade poli-
cy, which gave greater influence to exporter interests, because the President was 
elected from a national constituency54. The new reciprocity treaty with Cuba in 
1934, which lowered the sugar tariff for Cuba, was the first treaty signed under 
this legislation, but it probably could not have happened without the protections 
to the mainland sugar industry provided by the quota system55. 
In a February 1934 message to Congress, Franklin D. Roosevelt submitted 
that the sugar act should serve three purposes: to overcome low prices received 
by domestic beet and cane farmers; to stop using protectionism to expand the 
domestic and insular sugar industries, which contributed to high prices for sugar; 
———— 
52 In 1933, beet sugar factories were located in California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. 
53 USNA R.G. 59, Series 837.6135, boxes 5970-5980; Papers of Manuel Rionda, Braga Brot-
hers Collection, R.G. 2, Series 10C; Archivo Nacional de Cuba (ANC), Fondo ICEA. A.O. KRUEGER 
[6] puzzles over the absence of refiner opposition to the bill; however, they naturally were avoiding 
publicity, as the refiners’ cartel, the Sugar Institute, was under investigation for antitrust violations. 
54 See M. BAILEY, J. GOLDSTEIN and B. WEINGAST [23], and D.A. IRWIN and R. KROSZNER, «Inte-
rests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: the Republican Conversion to Trade 
Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley», Journal of Law and Economics, 42, Chicago, 1999, pp. 643-73. 
55 See J. DALTON [13]. 
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and to contribute to the economic rehabilitation of Cuba56. In his April 1934 mes-
sage to Congress, in which he submitted the Administration’s version of the bill, 
he mentioned Cuba only in reference to the lost US exports57. It was not acciden-
tal that the only reference to Cuba in this message was in reference to its effects 
on US exports to Cuba. Conflicted interests in the nation at large as well as wit-
hin the executive branch led to compromise in the Administration’s proposal. 
After the September sugar-industry agreement was declared a failure, Roosevelt 
had requested that Cuba’s quota be raised from 1.7 to 2 million short tons to 
achieve economic and foreign policy objectives regarding Cuba (Cuban diplo-
mats had argued that even 2 million was below the minimum necessary for ade-
quate recovery.) Though some officials in the Sugar Division of the Department 
of Agriculture tried to preserve the 1.7 million ton quota for Cuba, that number 
was eventually brought up to 1.94 apparently largely through the efforts of offi-
cials in the State Department, with the President’s backing58. 
To be sure, the motive to avoid further economic and political disruption in 
Cuba was present among the factors that determined Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
recommendation to Congress. Though the State Department worked some in-
fluence, the marginal increase in Cuba’s quota even in Roosevelt’s proposal (see 
Table 3) suggests that, though it received some consideration, it did not dominate 
among the competing demands upon the policy. The request for a 2-million-ton 
quota for Cuba did not come close to its former market share. Moreover, it was 
not proposed except as an alternative to an agenda that was effectively driven by 
the analysis of the Tariff Commission, the New Deal package represented by the 
RTAAA and the AAA, and the domestic sugar industry’s proposed voluntary 
marketing agreement. Failure of Cuban sugar companies’ stock prices to recover, 
when the stocks of sugar companies in the other supplier areas did recover, alters 
the received view that the quota program overall was beneficial to Cuba. It may 
be that the quota program prevented Cuba’s complete elimination from the US 
market, as some contemporaries thought might otherwise occur. Nonetheless, it 
is only in that restricted sense that Cuba benefited. 
As for the prominence of official language praising the benefits it gave to 
Cuba, official statements after it was passed naturally exaggerated those benefits 
for their political effect. Representatives of the sugar industry in Cuba praised it 
as an achievement for similar reasons. Years later, the Havana daily, the Diario 
———— 
56 «Memorandum by Lawrence Duggan, of the State Depatment», USNA R.G. 59, 811.6135/209 ½, 
Feb. 9, 1934. 
57 See J. DALTON [13], and US COMMERCE DEPARTMENT, Foreign and Domestic Trade, Was-
hington D.C., USCD, 1934. 
58 «Dispatch from H. Freeman Matthews, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in the U.S. Embassy 
in Havana to the State Department», USNA R.G. 59, 811.6135/112, Feb. 13, 1934; and «Memoran-
dum of conversation between Weaver, chief of the sugar division of the dept. of agriculture, Law-
rence Duggan, Department of State, and Herb Feis, Office of the Economic Advisor, Department of 
State», USNA R.G. 59, 811.6135/91, Dec. 16, 1933. 
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de la Marina, continued to defend it: «Coordination, no matter how mediocre it 
may be, is better than anarchy»59. At the time, it would have been seen as «bad 
form» for Cuban industry leaders, who had sought US help to restore their prin-
cipal market, or Cuban diplomats who had sought US help to restore political 
stability, to be ungrateful to their friends in Washington for the efforts made. And 
besides, the outcome could have been much worse. 
 
 
 
In the history of Cuban sugar industry, the most significant institutional factor after 1930 was 
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59 Diario de la Marina, La Habana, sep. 2, 1937. 
